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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
  Douglas B. Malar appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for 
post-conviction relief. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 On May 18, 2015, Malar filed a petition for post-conviction relief 
challenging his conviction for DUI.  (R., pp. 4-7.)  He alleged ineffective 
assistance of counsel for failing to file a motion to suppress, failing to inform him 
“exactly” what constituted the offense, and wishing to proceed to arraignment 
without discovery.  (R., pp. 5-6, 9.)  He also alleged that law enforcement 
withheld favorable evidence and that he pled guilty because of threats.  (R., p. 5.)  
He requested to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed with a trial.  (R., p. 6.) 
 The state filed a motion for summary dismissal, asserting that the petition 
was untimely to challenge the May 11, 2012 judgment.  (Aug., pp. 10-11.)  Malar 
acknowledged that his petition had not been filed within a year, but asserted that 
his failure to do so was “due to the ineffective counsel [sic] of all of my Public 
Defenders that ultimately led to my untimely filing of the Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief.”  (R., pp. 14-15; Aug. pp. 13-15.)  His specific allegations were 
as follows: 
2. On March 16, 2012, I was arraigned in CR 12-1289. At that 
time I expressed to Sarah Sears, my appointed Public Defender, 
that I did not feel I was guilty of the underlying criminal matter. 
 
3. In May 2012, after l was sentenced, I asked my Public 
Defender about appealing my case because I still felt I was not 
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guilty. When my probation was set, Ms. Sears informed me there 
was no further action I could take on the matter. 
 
4. When I violated my probation in September 2012, I again 
asked if there was a way to retract my plea, or appeal my case, and 
I was informed there was not. 
 
5. In December 2014, l asked Lisa Cheeseboro, the assigned 
Public Defender, about having the issue revisited. She informed me 
she was not aware of a way to do so. 
 
6. Christopher Schwartz was assigned as my Public Defender 
when my sentence was imposed on January 9, 2015. I asked him 
about appealing my case and was told I could not appeal my 
sentence or conviction regardless of the fact that I entered an 
Alford Plea. I entered a Rule 35 plea at that time. 
 
7. It was not until I came to prison that I learned about the 
Motion for Post-Conviction Relief and how it may benefit me. 
 
(R., p. 15.) 
 The district court granted the motion for summary dismissal.  (R., pp. 17-
24.)  The district court held that Malar’s petition was time-barred.  (R., pp. 20-21.)  
The district court determined that, to be timely from the judgment, the petition 
had to be filed before June 23, 2013.  (R., p. 20.)  In addressing tolling, the 
district court accepted Malar’s allegations, made in his affidavit in response to the 
state’s motion, that his attorneys had told him he could neither appeal nor seek 
post-conviction relief.  (R., p. 23.)  Applying the relevant legal standard of 
whether the petitioner knew of the factual basis for his claims, the district court 
concluded that Malar knew the factual basis for his claims in 2012, and therefore 
the time to file the petition did not toll.  (R., pp. 23-24.) 
 The district court entered judgment (R., p. 26), from which Malar timely 





 Malar states the issue on appeal as: 
 Did the district court err in dismissing Mr. Malar’s Post-
Conviction Petition after finding it was untimely filed?  
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 4.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Malar does not assert that the claims alleged in his petition were timely or 
that the district court erred in dismissing them.  He instead argues that the facts 
he asserted in relation to his tolling argument constitute viable and timely claims 
for post-conviction relief on which he should have been allowed to proceed.  Has 











 Malar does not challenge the dismissal, on statute of limitation grounds, of 
the claims asserted in his petition.  (Appellant’s brief.)  Malar argues that 
because the state conceded that the facts in his affidavit in opposition to the 
state’s motion for summary dismissal must be considered true for purposes of 
the motion, those facts were “litigated by all of the parties in this case.”  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-9.)  Therefore, according to Malar, a claim of ineffective 
assistance of probation counsel was “fully tried by consent.”  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp. 9-10.)  Malar argues that, because the claim was tried by consent, he must 
be granted an evidentiary hearing on the claim.  (See Appellant’s brief, p. 5 
(“Malar certainly should have been allotted an evidentiary hearing on this 
claim”).)  This argument is flawed. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 On appeal from an order of summary dismissal, the appellate court 
applies the same standards utilized by the trial courts and examines whether the 
petitioner’s admissible evidence asserts facts which, if true, would entitle the 
petitioner to relief.  Gutierrez-Medina v. State, 157 Idaho 34, 36, 333 P.3d 849, 
851 (Ct. App. 2014) (citing Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675, 227 P.3d 925, 
929 (2010)).  The appellate court exercises free review over questions of law.  Id. 




C. Malar’s Claim That The Facts Alleged In His Affidavit In Opposition To The 
State’s Motion For Summary Dismissal Were Tried By Consent Fails 
Because There Has Been No Trial 
 
“An application for post-conviction relief must specifically set forth the 
grounds upon which the application is based, and clearly state the relief desired.”  
Monahan v. State, 145 Idaho 872, 875, 187 P.3d 1247, 1250 (Ct. App. 2008) 
(citing I.C. § 19-4903).  “All grounds for relief must be raised in the original, 
supplemental, or amended application.”  Id. (citing I.C. § 19-4908).  It is 
undisputed that the “claim” on which Malar asserts he is entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing is not pled in the petition.   
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) permits parties to try issues not raised 
by the pleadings with the explicit or implicit consent of the parties.  See I.R.C.P. 
15(b).  Rule 15(b) only applies to unpled theories that are litigated through the 
submission of evidence at trial.  Estes v. Barry, 132 Idaho 82, 86, 967 P.2d 284, 
288 (1998).  Rule 15(b) does not apply to factual issues raised in a motion for 
summary judgment.  Id.  “Rule 15(b) applies only to unpled theories that are 
litigated through the submission of evidence at a trial of the cause on the merits, 
and not to factual issues raised in a motion for summary judgment.”  Id.   
Malar’s claim fails on the law because there have been no issues tried by 
consent, because there has been no trial.  This case was dismissed in summary 
dismissal proceedings.  An evidentiary hearing (trial) in order to litigate a claim on 
the merits is the remedy Malar is seeking.  His claim that he is entitled to litigate 
the merits of the assertions in the affidavit because he has already by consent 
litigated those merits makes no sense, legally or logically.   
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Malar’s argument also fails on the facts.  In support of its motion for 
summary dismissal, the state argued that the question presented was “whether 
the statute of limitations in effect can be abrogated in this case.”  (8/25/15 Tr., p. 
5, Ls. 15-18.)  The state argued that tolling required lack of access to courts due 
to incapacitation or geographical impediments, but did not apply where a 
defendant was given bad advice on challenging his conviction by counsel.  
(8/25/15 Tr., p. 5, L. 19 – p. 6, L. 16.)  In making this argument, the state 
acknowledged that the facts asserted in Malar’s affidavit in opposition to the 
state’s motion must be assumed to be correct.  (8/25/15 Tr., p. 6, Ls. 6-9.)   
In responding to the state’s argument, Malar’s counsel acknowledged that 
there was no claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding advice on 
appeal or pursuing post-conviction, but that they were considering filing an 
amended petition to assert that claim.  (8/25/15 Tr., p. 7, Ls. 3-14.)  Counsel then 
argued that the factual assertions in Malar’s affidavit should provide equitable 
tolling for the petition.  (8/25/15 Tr., p. 7, L. 18 – p. 10, L. 25.)  Counsel 
concluded:  “If the Court makes the determination it shouldn’t [apply equitable 
tolling], he’s past his deadlines.  If it finds it should, then he should be allowed to 
file an amended petition with the assistance of counsel and proceed with his 
claims.”  (8/25/15 Tr., p. 11, Ls. 1-4.)  
The prosecutor replied that the remedy requested in the petition was 
withdrawal of the guilty plea and a trial, and that claims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel for “not being advised of the post conviction relief statute” did not 
show prejudice.  (8/25/15 Tr., p. 11, L. 8 – p. 12, L. 1.)  The district court asked 
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whether Malar’s allegations he “asked for an appeal and didn’t get one” had to be 
accepted as true.  (8/25/15 Tr., p. 12, Ls. 2-6.)  The prosecutor agreed, stating he 
was “not controverting the fact that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel,” but even “[a]ssuming he did not receive correct legal advice” such 
would not legally toll the statute of limitations.  (8/25/15 Tr., p. 12, Ls. 7-25.)  The 
district court then asked about Malar’s counsel’s comments about amendment, 
and the prosecutor agreed that Malar “would be able to bring up items that 
occurred” within a year prior to filing.  (8/25/15 Tr., p. 13, L. 1 - p. 14, L. 7.) 
This record does not support Malar’s claim that the parties “litigated” 
claims in his affidavit in opposition to the state’s motion for summary judgment.  
To the contrary, it is clear that both parties understood that for those claims to be 
properly before the court the petition would have to be amended.  The record 
only establishes that the parties and the district court understood well-established 
law: that because the affidavit was uncontroverted, its allegations had to be 
accepted as true for purposes of summary dismissal.  E.g., Hayes v. State, 146 
Idaho 353, 355, 195 P.3d 712, 714 (Ct. App. 2008) (“For purposes of considering 
a summary dismissal motion, an applicant's uncontroverted factual allegations 
contained in an application for post-conviction relief and supporting affidavits are 
deemed to be true.”).   
Malar’s argument that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for 
failing to file an appeal from revocation of probation was litigated by the parties, 
and therefore the case should be remanded with instructions to hold an 
evidentiary hearing on that issue, is meritless.  Moreover, the argument also fails 
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because the record shows that the parties understood that the only mechanism 
to get that claim before the court was by amending the petition.  Malar has failed 




 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the summary dismissal 
of the petition for post-conviction relief. 
 
 DATED this 2nd day of June, 2016. 
 
 
      _/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
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